INTRODUCTION
US corporates have traditionally relied on debt raised in the capital markets to a significantly greater extent than UK corporates. Sources suggest that US borrowing has been split roughly 70:30 in favour of the debt capital markets, compared with an almost diametrically opposed split 30:70 in the UK in favour of bank debt.
1 However, following the most recent financial crisis there is increasing evidence that this picture may be changing. European banks face economic, political and regulatory *Assistant Professor in Law, the London School of Economics and Political Sciencechallenges which make them unreliable as the sole source of finance for corporate Britain. Private equity sponsored businesses rely on leverage levels which may be unachievable in post-recession loan markets and cheaper institutional money may be accessible through the debt capital markets.
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One aspect of the changing nature of UK debt markets is an increase in the number of high yield bonds issued by UK issuers available for purchase by US investors. A high yield security is a bond which is rated less than 'investment grade' by credit-rating agencies. Credit-rating agencies assess the likelihood that a company will default on its debt. Where the risk of default is low, the creditrating agency will provide what is known as an investment grade credit rating for the bond. Where the risk of default is higher, the credit rating will be below investment grade and investors will expect a higher interest rate and yield on their investment to compensate for the higher risk. There are a number of levels of rating and the high yield universe covers a reasonably wide spectrum, from bonds rated just below investment grade to much riskier bonds which have lost their credit rating entirely.
3
A UK issuer seeking to issue securities for sale in the US market will normally make a so-called Rule 144A offering. 4 Rule 144A provides a means for foreign issuers to offer securities for sale to sophisticated investors in the US without becoming subject to all US securities laws requirements for public offerings. 5 It is popular as a means of persuading European investors that they will be able to access the US secondary market in trading the securities which they purchase. 6 The fact that a Rule
144A offering is included and that the bond is governed by New York Law does not, of itself, give any
This would appear to support those who have doubted the causal relationship between law and the development of capital markets proposed by the 'law matters' theorists. Thus a new case study emerges, examining the relationship between insolvency law's valuation regime and the development of high yield capital markets. In particular, we will be interested in those who have recognised the link between law and equity capital markets but have suggested a reverse causality.
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Some of these scholars have questioned whether a desire to access equity capital markets fuelled ex post convergence in corporate governance standards, specifically convergence around a US model as foreign firms accessed the equity capital markets of the US for fund raising. As UK issuers increasingly seek access to US investors in high yield debt, similar questions arise as to the prospects for convergence in the UK valuation standard towards the US model. In seeking to address these questions, this article will find that none of the existing evolutionary theories provides a complete answer, and a new account will emerge of adaptation by the finance market to legal environment.
The article is organised as follows. Part 1 considers very broadly the existing evolutionary theories relevant to the account. Part 2 examines the development of the high yield securities market in the UK in the context of these theories and reveals a new account of adaptation in the high yield market to legal environment. Part 3 considers the significance of this adaptation in the finance market for the prospects of convergence between the approaches of English and US law to valuation in distress.
Part 4 touches on the interaction between the high yield market and other influences on the law.
The article then concludes, and a synthesis of existing evolutionary theory and the adaptive account in this article is attempted as a framework for future work on convergence between law and finance in developed economies.
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW
The purpose of this section is to provide the reader with a high level overview of existing evolutionary theories which take, as their starting point, other questions of law and finance and 10 See text to n 23 below which this article will examine in the context of high yield markets and valuation. As we have already touched upon, much of this work is focused on the relationship between the depth and strength of a country's equity capital markets and minority shareholder protection. Some scholars have attempted to explore the relationship between the depth and strength of debt markets in a jurisdiction and its insolvency laws, 11 but hitherto, with one notable exception, this work has looked at the general condition of credit markets and has tended to take a high level approach, in order to enable comparisons between a large numbers of jurisdictions, 12 or, alternatively, has focused on developing or transition economies. 13 In contrast, this article will be concerned with a specific condition in two highly developed economies.
The notable exception is research which has sought to investigate the link between corporate governance in insolvency and ownership structure. In 1998 David Skeel published work suggesting that there was a strong link between widely dispersed share ownership and 'manager-driven' insolvency procedures and between concentrated share ownership and 'manager-displacing' insolvency procedures. 14 The US conformed to this pattern but the UK appeared to be an anomaly as it had an established, widely dispersed equity capital market but a 'manager-displacing' insolvency regime. John Armour, Brian Cheffins and David Skeel subsequently sought to solve this puzzle, suggesting that the missing link was the nature of the credit market in the jurisdiction. 15 Specifically, they proposed that a concentrated credit market was consistent with a 'managerdisplacing' insolvency procedure, whilst a dispersed credit market was consistent with a 'manager- driven' insolvency procedure. 16 They suggested that movement towards a more dispersed creditor economy in the UK may drive convergence with US 'manager-driven' governance in insolvency. 17 In the event, significant evolutions in the debt markets and restructuring practice on both sides of the Atlantic mean that Skeel's original classification of insolvency regimes as 'manager-displacing' or 'manager-driven' requires some amendment to reflect current reality and, consequently, Armour,
Cheffins and Skeel's piece (which built upon it) also requires updating. The limited space in this article will not permit a full analysis which would do justice to the original work and that will have to wait for another day. One point, though, will be worthy of note and we will come back to that later in this article. The analysis begins, however, with the initial condition of the high yield market and the 'law matters' thesis.
In a 1997 paper, La Porta, Lopes-di-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny advanced a specific theory on the relationship between law and equity capital markets. 18 A number of papers followed and in a 2008 review of the extent to which the theory had stood the test of time, three of the authors neatly summarised it as follows:
1. Legal rules and regulations differ systematically across countries, and those differences can be measured and quantified 2. These differences in legal rules and regulations are accounted for to a significant extent by legal origins 3. The basic historical divergence in the styles of the legal traditions -the policy implementing focus of civil law versus the market supporting focus of common law -explains why legal rules differ 4. The measured differences in legal rules matter for economic and social outcomes. with whether what emerges is 'continent-wide evolutions, arguably linked to the process of capitalist development' rather than development linked to country-specific features. 21 Other scholars have queried aspects of the legal origin theorists' methodology, 22 and, as discussed below, there have been a number of challenges to the legal institutional account. For present purposes, however, we are concerned not so much with the 'legal origin' controversy but rather with the objection of 'reverse causality'.
Scholars who take issue with the 'law matters' thesis on the grounds of reverse causality argue that it is not that the case that the right legal conditions need to be in place in order for markets to develop, but rather that countries improve their laws protecting investors as their financial markets develop, perhaps under political pressure from those investors. Cheffins and Coffee have argued that contrary to the account of the 'law matters' theorists, in the early stages of its development the English market offered only weak protection for minority equity investors but that other factors encouraged the emergence of a modern securities system which in turn drove change. 23 This question of the causal relationship between legal condition and capital markets will be significant in the examination of the development of the high yield market in the UK, given the profoundly different approach to valuation of the firm in restructuring law from that prevailing in the US.
The debate also embraces a further distinction of some importance: the distinction between functional and formal convergence. If markets converge functionally, then it may be possible for them to operate in a substantively similar way, notwithstanding persistent differences in the law. 24 Coffee has provided a specific example of functional convergence in equity capital markets. In his study of cross-border convergence in corporate governance protections for minority shareholders, Coffee pointed to the fact that in accessing US equity capital markets issuers became contractually bound by the corporate governance requirements of US securities laws. 25 Whilst a regulatory contract is not of explicit interest in the context of valuation standards on default of a high yield bond issue, possible convergence in valuation standard through the complex finance documents negotiated for the issue will be. Coffee's examination of the securities laws liabilities issues with a US listing will also feature in the account. As UK issuers of high yield bonds access the US debt capital market via a Rule 144A offering, potential US securities laws liability will be implicated and we will consider the extent to which this may cause UK issuers to adopt US valuation standards in default even in the absence of a strict legal requirement to do so.
Others, though, have doubted how far functional convergence can go. Cheffins has highlighted, in the corporate governance context, the costs involved in a dual listing (which may act as a deterrent for some companies) and the limitations of minority shareholder protection through the regulatory contract, given the ongoing influence of local courts. 26 Financial distress, as opposed to economic distress, occurs when the firm's capital structure is no longer appropriate for its balance sheet and must be adjusted. 41 If a financially distressed business is to be reorganised, rather than sold, then as Clark explains not only is it necessary to determine whether the value of the business as a going concern exceeds the value which would be received if it were to be liquidated, but:
Some finite value had to be placed on the whole business. Otherwise, there would be no way of telling where, down the contractually created ranks of creditors and preferred shareholders, it was fair to stop issuing shares and other claims in the newly organised entity owning the business.
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As the high yield securities market began to develop in the US, there was already a developed restructuring law which tackled these questions. By contrast, the UK had no single restructuring procedure with clearly articulated principles for dealing with questions of value. 43 Yet despite this apparent uncertainty a high yield market began to develop in the UK as the 1990s progressed. One explanation may be that investors were investing more by reference to the probability of default than the return on investment if a default occurred. 44 Another plausible explanation, which echoes This explanation receives some support from another significant difference in the ways in which the market was to develop in these early years. On both sides of the Atlantic, the most senior part of the capital structure was generally bank debt, usually comprising a term loan and a revolving credit facility. 46 Although Kaplan and Stein have recorded a decline in the ratio of bank to bond debt in the US throughout the 1980s, bank debt remained a significant proportion of the capital structure.
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In the US at this time high yield bonds were traditionally contractually subordinated to senior indebtedness. 48 This meant that the borrower of the senior debt was also the issuer of the subordinated debt and once the senior creditors had been paid, the holders of the subordinated high yield debt would have access to the residual proceeds of the assets. In the UK, lending banks were extremely wary about the arrival of the high yield note holders in the market. The noteholders were an anonymous group, highly fragmented and difficult to locate. The debt could be expected to trade widely, particularly if a default were in prospect, leading to conflicting agendas between creditors. 49 Moreover, bondholders were unlikely to regard themselves bound by the so-called principled approach as to how lenders were expected to behave when a UK corporate experienced financial distress.
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The UK banks were still providing much of the senior debt in the capital structure of many highly leveraged corporates in the English market. As a result of their concerns, they insisted on structural subordination of the high yield bond, as well as contractual subordination. This meant that the bond was issued by a holding company of the borrower of the senior debt, without the benefit of the security or guarantee package provided by the operating companies for the senior debt, effectively placing the high yield bondholders further away from the assets than the trade creditors. 51 This structure was highly unpopular and there were signs that it was actively holding back development of the high yield market in the UK and in Europe more generally. The crisis came to a head in 2002
when greater losses on defaults in Europe than in the US brought home to investors the risks of structural subordination. High yield investors organised and boycotted European issuances for a number of months. 52 Although the boycott was a fragile one, it was enough to force a gradual change in stance by UK banks who increasingly allowed high yield security holders to take subordinated guarantees and asset security from operating companies. Ultimately, it was the arrival of the US bondholders as a significant source of capital which acted as the catalyst for change.
Early restructurings of high yield bonds by UK companies were to pass without significant surprise for the market. In 2002 the British cable group NTL announced that it had reached agreement in principle with an unofficial committee of its public bondholders on a comprehensive recapitalisation.
The proposal involved a significant debt-for-equity swap, with only certain warrant rights allocated to equity. But crucially the restructuring was implemented using a pre-negotiated Chapter 11 plan and followed a pattern of negotiation entirely familiar to the US bondholders. 53 Matters were to turn out a little differently, however, when MyTravel, a UK-based holiday company listed on the London Stock Exchange, sought to implement a restructuring of its bank and bond debt through the English courts. 54 In an attempt (ultimately successful) to persuade its bondholders to agree to a consensual, out-of-court restructuring, MyTravel proposed a scheme of arrangement pursuant to which senior lenders would receive a significant equity allocation in a new company in exchange for their debt. The new company would acquire all of the business and assets of MyTravel in consideration for this debt exchange and would offer to acquire bondholders' debt in exchange for a limited amount of equity. Bondholders who refused would find themselves stranded in the old company -now devoid of any assets to meet their claims.
The MyTravel case was to bring home to US investors in debt securities issued by UK issuers just how different the legal regimes were on either side of the Atlantic. In a Chapter 11 restructuring, equity and creditors are divided into classes for the purposes of voting on the plan, with creditors similarly situated in the capital structure voting together. Provided at least one class whose rights will be 'impaired' by the plan votes in favour of it, the bankruptcy judge may confirm the plan against the wishes of other dissenting classes provided the plan meets, amongst other things, the requirements of the 'best interests' test and the 'absolute priority rule'. 55 The first of these requires that the class is no worse off under the plan than they would be in liquidation. 56 In many cases this will not provide significant protection to holders of debt or equity securities issued by financially distressed businesses whose value in the market may be severely depressed. 57 The 57 Assuming that the restructuring is occurring because the business is over-leveraged (broadly, its value is less than the total amount of its debt) the current market price for the business and assets may indicate that the equity and/or the junior debt are 'out of the money'. However, there may be arguments that the current price available for the business and assets of a distressed business in the market undervalues it. For a more detailed description see Paterson n 43 above 348-353 more promising ground for challenge. The absolute priority rule requires that no class may recover under the plan until senior classes have recovered what they are owed. 58 But the corollary to this is that those in the senior class must recover no more than they are owed under the plan. 59 Where, as will often be the case, the plan involves a debt-for-equity exchange, junior security holders may
argue that the senior class should not receive the entire equity allocation -otherwise, once the business or the market recovers, the senior lenders will recover more than they are entitled to under the absolute priority rule. This has been a fruitful area of litigation for junior stakeholders in the US, particularly as jurisprudence has developed to suggest that in assessing value for the purposes of a
Chapter 11 valuation dispute, courts should look not only to the current market price for the business but also to valuation opinions. 60 These opinions are highly subjective and have given junior stakeholders a potentially useful weapon in defending their continued residual interest in the firm.
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Scholars have suggested that the consequence of this legal regime is that creditors negotiating in the shadow of insolvency law in the US have been motivated to reach agreement without recourse to the full weight of a (lengthy, costly and unpredictable) Chapter 11 valuation fight, increasing the prospects that some consideration will be given to the junior class.
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When MyTravel came to court in 2004, the legal environment for junior security holders in the UK was far less hospitable than in the US. The UK courts had tended to focus solely on the counterfactual (what will happen if the restructuring is not agreed, typically a sale of the business and assets as a going concern or a sale of the assets on a break-up basis) such that restructurings were viewed through the lens of the current market price for the business and assets or, where a what the effects of the proposals would be on broader lending to business in general, not just those in distress. 69 The Insolvency Service therefore announced proposals to press ahead with work on the moratorium idea but that plans to introduce rescue financing would not be taken forward. 70 In the event, however, even the moratorium concept was to run into the sand.
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This short history of attempts by the high yield community to lobby for legislative change is illuminating. Whilst the EHYA attempted to pitch their proposals as making only minor amendments to the status quo there can be no doubt that in reality the proposals required a radical overhaul of English insolvency law. Many scholars have noted that for major reform efforts to gain traction political institutions need to be prepared to ignore the blocking efforts of interest groups protecting existing arrangements. 72 In the case of the EHYA's efforts, it is perhaps unsurprising that in the struggle between opposing groups for limited resources the established senior secured clearing bank 75 and Clark has noted a more subtle interplay in the evolutionary agenda -a need for lawyers 'intellectually blinded by the influence of their modes of legal thought' to shift their perspectives and embrace change. 76 Given the fledgling size of the high yield market, and the continued exposure of leading English lawyers to the old ways, it is perhaps not surprising that the market was not ready to shift its existing conceptual framework or value systems.
If formal convergence through legislative change was not to be, what was to be the impact of US bondholders on the development of English insolvency law in the cases emerging from the Great Recession? The answer is, relatively slight. As Landes and Posner have highlighted, a court system provides two types of service. One is resolution of the particular dispute between the parties. The second is what they describe as 'rule formulation' -creating rules of law through the process of dispute resolution. 77 The unanswered questions of valuation might have been expected to be a prime candidate for clarification in the recent recession. Ultimately, however, only one of the restructurings implemented through legal procedure, and involving subordinated debt, resulted in full, formal, legal challenge by junior creditors. 78 The result was neither to force change nor to clarify the status quo but rather to leave the principles by which the English court will decide a restructuring perhaps even murkier than they had been before. On the one hand, Mr Justice Mann definitely did not shut the door on arguments that a restructuring should not be judged solely by 73 For the role played by the existing distribution of wealth and power between interest groups in the economy in enabling interest groups to mobilise and exert pressure, see Bebchuk and Roe n 29 above, 157-158. 74 On cost and legislative reform see, for example, Gilson n 24 above, 345; Ahlering and Deakin n 22 above, 870 and Roe, 'Chaos and Evolution' n 20 above, 643 75 In his work on the evolution of the law through court precedent Johnston has argued that the number of cases which come to court is significant. 79 He argues that it is the very process of looking at exceptions to an apparently settled rule over a number of cases which leads judges to conclude that there may be deficiencies in the rule. Accordingly, an isolated challenge on difficult facts may not be expected to bring about radical change. Yet this does not explain why so few cases did, in fact, emerge particularly as challenges might have been expected not only from junior bondholders but also junior lenders in complex bank loan structures (with senior debt and other layers of debt subordinated (junior) to it). 80 Although a number of UK restructurings proceeded consensually, this cannot be a complete answer because in some the allocation to junior creditors was very small and in others junior creditors were effectively wiped out but chose not to mount a challenge. Clark has highlighted that the risk that litigation may harden the law against the plaintiff may deter the plaintiff from litigating in the first place. 85 The analysis is made even more complex in the current context as creditors who are junior creditors today may appear as senior creditors in the next case. In other words, it may not be obvious to them what sort of law it is that they want. 86 In addition, many creditors may have the benefit of credit default swaps -which provide them with an effective hedge against the insolvency of the debtor such that they would rather take no risk on a restructuring at all but prefer either to continue to collect interest payments on the debt or collect on the credit default swap contract if the debtor fails.
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In addition to these creditor-orientated reasons for the paucity of cases, wider market conditions may also have played a part. A number of commentators have worried over the so-called zombie company phenomenon during this crisis. 88 One category of 'zombie' is of particular interest in the present context -a company generating enough cash to service its debt but which diverts so much of its cash resource to this endeavour that it is left with no money for investment -which should mean that it will struggle to compete as the market recovers and demand increases. 89 A number of factors may have contributed to banks allowing companies in this position to continue rather than demanding repayment of their loans in this recession. The first is that the persistently low-interest 83 ibid Posner, 428. Furthermore, the junior creditor challenging an allocation of equity in a restructuring may expect to receive only a small allocation even if he is ultimately successful. In this analysis, therefore, the risk of high costs may significantly outweigh the anticipated benefit. 84 96 The Loan Market Association recommended form of inter-creditor agreement for leveraged loans contains optional requirements for the security agent to obtain a market value, and a fair market valuation opinion from an independent financial adviser, see C. Howard and B. Hedger Restructuring Law and Practice (London: Butterworths, 2 nd ed, 2014), 233 fn 2 and accompanying text protection in the intercreditor agreement is likely to be formal rather than substantive given that the subjective opinions are to be advanced by valuers appointed by controlling senior creditors.
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The continued growth of the market notwithstanding the lack of both functional and formal convergence in valuation standard is not as puzzling, however, as may at first appear as new adaptations have emerged in the current high yield market itself. There has been an explosion in secured high yield bond issues globally. 98 Moreover, the term loan/senior debt feature of highly leveraged capital structures appears to be in decline in the UK. Instead, either a comparatively small revolving credit facility has been raised for working capital purposes, which is entitled to priority on default, with all bond debt ranking pari passu behind it, or bank and bond debt have ranked pari passu in the senior part of the capital structure. Unlike the dramatic increase in secured debt, this adaptation in capital structure does not appear to be occurring evenly in the US and EMEA. The law firm Proskauer Rose LLP has undertaken a detailed review of high yield bond terms across the globe. Their survey results illustrate that whilst the number of high yield deals with first ranking security has increased in EMEA, exceeding two thirds of all issues in 2013, the trend in the high yield market in the US appears to be in the other direction. In their 2013 Global High Yield
Report of the secured high yield market 43% of secured high yield bond issues in the US had first ranking security, 32% second ranking security and 25% 'split lien' (where the bonds have a first lien on certain assets and a second lien on other assets) compared with 73% first ranking security in EMEA, 19% second ranking security and 8% split lien. But the most recent Global High Yield Survey illustrates a fall in the number of first ranked deals in the US and a growth in EMEA.
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Although Proskauer Rose's data is aggregated for EMEA, the trend which their data reveals towards first priority deals in EMEA reflects data the author has compiled for high yield bond issues by UK issuers over the same period. 100 The higher incidence of second lien debt in the US may suggest that investors are more comfortable with the treatment of junior bondholders in the event of a default.
In any event the adaptation in the capital structure of high yield bond issues by UK issuers may be hugely significant for the prospect of convergence in restructuring law.
SIGNIFICANCE OF ADAPTATION FOR PROSPECTS OF CONVERGENCE IN VALUATION STANDARD
Determining the law governing the restructuring
The vast majority of recent Rule 144A high yield bond issues by UK issuers have been governed by US (normally New York) law. Issuers have understood this to be a requirement in order for the bonds to be tradable in the US debt capital markets. 101 One option might, therefore, be for the UK issuer to submit to a Chapter 11 process (or, at least, to threaten a Chapter 11 process as a contingency plan during negotiation). Its debt is, after all, governed by New York law and it is a principle of English private international law that the English courts will recognise a foreign discharge of a debt governed by the laws of that jurisdiction. 102 However, in order for this to provide a viable route, an UK issuer will need to be confident that the English courts will recognise the effects of the Chapter 11 plan given that its assets are likely to be located in the UK. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Rubin v Eurofinance casts considerable doubt over this question.
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Rubin involved a scam perpetrated in the US by The Consumers Trust ("TCT"), established by the terms of an English law governed trust deed. The settlor of the trust was Eurofinance SA, a BVI 100 See also IFLR 2014 High Yield Report: UK at section 5 'Nowadays in most European high yield bond issuances, senior bonds rank pari passu with high yield creditors, whereas the revolving credit facility lenders and hedge counterparties benefit from a super priority status in the waterfall of enforcement proceeds' and C. 107 The principle of 'universalism' required that wherever possible there should be a single insolvency proceeding in relation to an insolvent debtor which takes place in one jurisdiction and has one effect and that to this end, wherever possible, the English court should give assistance to such a foreign insolvency proceeding. 108 However, the English approach was one of 'modified' universalism. The court was able to give assistance to the extent that it would be consistent with justice and UK public policy to do so. In Cambridge Gas this appears to have found expression in the principle that the court could grant assistance wherever the domestic court could have achieved the same result in the case of a domestic insolvency -and the court concluded that the same result Hoffman had found in Cambridge Gas that it was no objection to the implementation of the plan in the Isle of Man that the shares in Navigator belonged to a person who was not a party to the bankruptcy proceedings, as a shareholder was bound by the transactions into which the company had entered, including a Chapter 11 Plan, 110 an analysis for which there is some scholarly support.
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Lord Collins was certainly not persuaded on any of the grounds. In concluding that Cambridge Gas was wrongly decided he stated:
The Privy Council accepted (in view of the conclusion that there had been no submission to the jurisdiction of the court in New York) that Cambridge Gas was not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the US Bankruptcy Court. The property in question, namely the shares in Navigator, was situate in the Isle of Man and therefore also not subject to the in rem jurisdiction of the US Bankruptcy Court. It can be argued, for Lord Hoffman argues it, that he then becomes bound by everything which is done by and to the company, for he has no material existence to sue as a member of the company, and no independent property save as a member of the company … But if one takes the view that shares are choses in action, albeit complex ones, and are property, albeit moderately complex property, then their confiscation ought to be a matter for the courts of the place where the property is'. He went on to express the view, quoted by Lord Collins in Rubin at [53] that 'the decision in [Cambridge Gas] is wrong, for it requires a Manx court to give effect to a confiscation order made by a foreign court of property belonging to a person who was not subject to the personal jurisdiction of the foreign court'). to recognise US Chapter 11 proceedings with respect to UK issuers are of considerable significance.
Whilst it is possible to construe Rubin narrowly, and Rubin dealt with different conflicts of laws principles than those relating to a foreign discharge of a foreign-law governed debt, the judgment raises difficult questions where the Chapter 11 plan involves an exchange of debt into shares in a UK company. Absent an appeal all the way to the Supreme Court, it seems unlikely that an English court would recognise a Chapter 11 plan pursuant to which New York law governed debt was exchanged for shares in a company incorporated in England (or, indeed, in another jurisdiction outside the US), assuming that the shareholders did not consent to the plan. It is suggested, therefore, that US investors in securities issued by UK corporates will find that any debt-for-equity swap is likely to be concluded in the shadow of English insolvency law rather than (or as well as) in the shadow of Chapter 11 unless other adaptations to the Chapter 11 plan can be introduced and successfully defended.
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What does this mean for UK issuers of New York law governed high yield securities who find themselves embroiled in a contentious battle for equity post restructuring? The answer may be that it depends. In a highly leveraged but effectively 'pari' structure (that is, all the bond debt ranks equally behind a small amount of revolving credit which is amply covered by the assets, or bank and bond debt ranks equally) we might expect to see the valuation debate move back from an intercreditor debate to a debate between debt and equity. In this situation, the bondholders are collectively motivated to press for as low a value as possible in order to argue for the entire equity allocation. In this event, even US investors may be best advised to adopt the traditional English approach -focusing on the market price of the firm established by market testing rather than a .pdf (last accessed 18 July 2014), suggesting a structure in which the assets of the company are sold to a newly incorporated company in exchange for fresh equity in the 'newco', leaving dissenters stranded in the old shell -a technique already used in the English market and discussed briefly below. But whether such a structure would gain the necessary recognition in light of the Rubin decision, and how it would fare in the US courts, remains to be seen. more subjective valuation opinion approach. Thus, there might be expected to be little pressure from US bondholders for change -particularly if there are a significant number of restructurings in a generally depressed market. In contrast, if the restructuring implicates a traditional subordinated high yield bond issue, in which the bond is subordinated to a more sizeable portion of senior debt, we might expect to find bondholders in the junior piece pushing vigorously for an approach consistent with the approach adopted by the US courts and looking to subjective valuation opinions to support a residual interest in the company.
In this account, it is the number of investors entering the market and the capital structures which they invest in which determines whether there will be change in the law. In other words, a complex picture emerges of adaptation in the finance markets and sporadic change in the legal environment making it hard to predict the interaction between the two systems. This challenge is amply illustrated if one reviews Skeel's taxonomy for corporate governance in insolvency ('managerdisplacing' and 'manager-driven') 115 and Armour, Skeel and Cheffins predictive piece on US and UK convergence in corporate governance in insolvency which was based upon it. 116 As Armour, Cheffins and Skeel predicted, the legal techniques used to achieve a restructuring in the UK today (a scheme of arrangement or a scheme of arrangement and a pre-packaged administration, discussed briefly below) avoid the true manager-displacing features of a full insolvency proceeding in the UK.
Nonetheless, these techniques continue to afford senior secured creditors significant control rights.
At the same time, the spectacular boom of US capital structures in which creditors have security over all or substantially all of the assets of the debtor and can dictate the course of a debt restructuring through the mechanism of the security arrangement, together with the rise of the market for distressed debt, has meant that practical, if not legal, control has passed to the secured creditors in the US. and Armour, Cheffins and Skeel might observe US/UK convergence around this third way. For present purposes, the important point is that it is the adaptation in the US finance market to a legal environment which creditors regarded as persistently manager friendly which has upset the legal evolutionary account.
Thus, if a traditional subordinated high yield bond issue is to be restructured, investors are likely to press for change in the way in which valuation questions are approached, reinforcing other influences pressing for change. But if no change occurs and the legal rules appear fixed, the finance market may adapt itself to the more hostile legal environment. If these adaptations occur, then the legal system may experience negative pressure from the finance system, dampening other influences pressing for change. During the process of adaptation it is possible for the legal system to experience both positive pressure for change (from legacy structures) and negative pressure for change (from adapted structures) at the same time. In this situation it is extremely difficult to predict how the two systems will interact. This analysis is supported by the approach of the US courts to recognition of the restructuring of New York law governed debt by foreign courts.
Implications of seeking US recognition of an English court restructuring of high yield debt
A UK issuer restructuring New York law governed debt held by a number of US creditors through an English process is likely to wish to seek recognition of that restructuring in the US courts. This may be because it has assets within the jurisdiction which it wishes to protect but even in the absence of assets, the issuer is likely to wish to avoid subsequent legal challenge in the US which may result in judgment against it, or which may result in a judgment creditor seeking to enforce in other jurisdictions where the company does own assets.
To date the prognosis for obtaining recognition is encouraging. The US has implemented the UNCITRAL Model Law on Recognition of Foreign Insolvency Proceedings in Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code. Unlike England (which has also adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law but as an addition to its other sources of jurisdiction for recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings)
Chapter 15 appears to be a single gateway entitling the US court to assist foreign insolvencies which take place in the 'COMI' or 'establishment' of the debtor. 119 Several foreign debtors have petitioned for, and been granted, Chapter 15 relief in relation to restructurings of New York law governed bonds by the English courts. 120 It is notable that all of these restructurings have involved schemes of arrangement and that none of them has been challenged by bondholders before the UK courts.
As discussed above, a US chapter 11 plan may be confirmed over the objection of a dissenting class if certain confirmation standards are met, including the best interests test and the absolute priority rule. If the plan is confirmed, it is 'crammed down' on the dissenting class. This power does not exist in an English law scheme of arrangement -in order to implement a restructuring without the consent of a dissenting class it is necessary to 'twin' the scheme of arrangement with a pre-packaged administration in order to strand the dissenting class in an empty corporate shell with no assets.
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There is a paucity of current case law on this technique in England. is not entirely on point as it related to a direct enforcement by a security trustee. 122 The other was touched on above and appears to have been an under-resourced and hastily assembled challenge. 123 Both cases show the English courts unwilling to shut the door completely on arguments that valuation evidence ought to be reviewed in assessing whether a senior class is receiving too good a deal under a restructuring plan. 124 If the number of US investors holding subordinated bonds issued by UK corporates increases significantly, then as we have seen it is possible that more challenges will arise to restructuring plans which seek to 'strand' bondholders but which are based solely on market price auction evidence as to the value of the business and which do not accommodate US-style valuation opinion evidence. As others have noted, the common law develops only as cases come to court and its development is highly dependent on the parties which argue these cases. 125 If the number of US holders of New York law governed subordinated high yield bonds issued by UK issuers increases, it might be anticipated either that plans will be developed and cases will be fought adopting a US approach by all sides or that more challenges to restructuring plans articulated in different terms will be launched.
If these sorts of challenges do arise, it is suggested that the desire for recognition of the plan by the US courts may lead issuers to prefer to prepare and argue cases in a way which the US courts will recognise from their domestic experience. This is because, although the Chapter 15 cases referred to above are encouraging, they are not a reason to be complacent that the US courts will automatically accord recognition for an English law restructuring where the issuer's COMI is in
England. In the first place, in more contentious cases the US courts have focused on the primary purpose of Chapter 15 as protecting the assets of the issuer located in the US. 126 This reflects the drafting of the Model Law itself. Whilst in other cases the US courts have shown themselves willing not to concentrate on an asset requirement, it remains a potential route for the refusal of relief where the issuer has no assets in the US and is seeking Chapter 15 relief as a purely defensive measure to avoid expensive litigation in the US which it is required to defend (or to prevent orders of the US court which may be enforced against the issuer in other jurisdictions (besides England)
where it does have assets).
Furthermore, in a number of recent cases the US courts have shown greater willingness to protect US creditors at the expense of the benefits for the case of recognising a foreign insolvency proceeding (and notwithstanding that the creditors have chosen to invest in a foreign issuer).
Chapter 15 contains an exception which enables the court to deny relief on the basis that it would be contrary to public policy. on which the US court may undertake a more extensive review. 129 A UK issuer restructuring a New
York law governed bond is likely to wish to have the comfort of Chapter 15 relief but, equally, an application for relief which is denied may be more damaging than refraining from seeking relief at the outset. It is suggested that this is likely to cause an issuer in contested restructurings to wish to be able to present its case to the US court in a way which the court will recognise -encouraging a focus on valuation opinions as well as market price and in voting on the plan in a way which is consistent with voting on a Chapter 11 plan.
On the other hand, as already suggested, the position may be entirely different in a 'pari' structure where the battleground is between bondholders and equity. In this case, the approach may turn on whether US investors are present only in the debt or in the debt and equity. In order to address these due diligence concerns, the practice has developed in all public offerings of securities in the US, and in Rule 144A offerings, that the US underwriters will request Counsel involved in the transaction to provide disclosure opinions in connection with the offering. In general (and unlike practice in the English market where 'cross table' opinions are not typically provided in debt transactions) opinion letters will be sought from counsel for both the issuer and the underwriters. Although in some transactions underwriters will be willing to settle for only one letter it would be unusual (and 'off market') for the underwriter's counsel to give an opinion where the issuer's counsel does not give one. If only one letter is to be provided it is likely to be the issuer's counsel who is providing it rather than the underwriter's counsel.
Thus in any subsequent financial restructuring, the spectre of securities laws litigation haunts all those involved in the original offering for the issuer. In addition to federal securities laws, state securities laws and the common law may be engaged. Investors may be incentivised to bring securities laws litigation which can be targeted at deep pockets rather than the beleaguered issuer.
In these circumstances, there may be a strong incentive for a UK issuer and its advisers, unfamiliar with the labyrinth of US securities laws litigation, to reach a consensual restructuring with its creditors, adopting a US-style approach to navigating a path to agreement. But how strongly this incentive operates may depend, again, on precisely where the US investors sit in the capital structure. In a 'pari' bond structure an aggressive plan for bondholders to retain all of the equity may delight US investors. On the other hand, in a more traditional subordinated structure, US bondholders may react angrily to attempts to cut them off through a scheme and pre-packaged administration structure and may point to the terms of the securities offering document in maximising their leverage. In this event, investors in the high yield market are likely to reinforce other pressures for change.
OTHER INFLUENCES
In Part III, the pressure for change coming from the high yield market was described in terms of its effect on other influences in the market. The high yield market represents only one of a number of influences on the legal system. Even if the high yield market is well-adapted to the apparently fixed legal regime, other influences may nonetheless continue to press for change in the law. The problem of prediction does not just lie, therefore, in the complexities arising within the high yield market itself but also in identifying other influences which may destabilise the legal system. 134 A complete review of all the influences on the question of valuation in restructuring law is outside the scope of this article and, in any event, probably impossible without the benefit of a crystal ball or a good deal of luck or hindsight. But it is worth touching on a couple, at least by way of illustration.
The first comes from the finance market itself.
Although the high yield market now represents an increasingly significant proportion of the English finance market, loan debt remains extremely important. 135 This is compounded by the speed with which the high yield market can shut down and the attractions for investors in financing loans rather than bonds. 136 As many of the so-called 'alternative lenders' have begun to provide loan finance through primary deals there is some evidence that the structure of highly leveraged loan facilities may also be changing. Just as high yield bond structures traditionally comprised some senior (lower priced) debt and some subordinated (high yield) debt, so a highly leveraged loan structure would traditionally comprise senior (lower priced) debt and subordinated (mezzanine or junior) debt at a higher interest rate. A new phenomenon has, however, made an appearance in the UK market -so called unitranche facilities. 137 Unitranche technology has existed in the US for some time but has only recently appeared in English deals. In a unitranche loan, the senior and junior debt is combined into a single facility which ranks pari passu, either at the top of the structure or, like the 'pari' high yield bond structures, behind a relatively small revolving credit, capital expenditure or acquisition facility which is well-covered by available collateral. The borrower pays a single, blended interest rate for the unitranche facility which is higher than the rate which would have been paid for the senior piece but lower than the rate which would have been paid for the mezzanine piece.
Unitranche lenders are likely to be entirely happy with an approach to valuation based on current market price for just the same reasons as were advanced for 'pari' high yield bonds. The valuation fight might be expected to be between creditors and equity rather than an inter-creditor battle and the lenders are likely to prefer an argument which favours 'cutting off' the equity holders.
Unitranche lenders and 'pari' high yield bond investors are both likely to operate as influences dampening demands for a change in the English approach to valuation.
However, whilst unitranche facilities are appearing in the English market, the move to this structure in the loan markets is not as pronounced as the move to the senior secured structure in the high yield bond market. 138 Unlike investors in unitranche facilities, junior or so-called mezzanine lenders can be expected to continue to prefer a move to a US style approach to valuation, and the introduction of valuation opinions rather than a reliance on market price alone. Thus mezzanine lenders are likely to operate as an influence reinforcing other demands for change.
At the same time, there is continuing pressure for greater substantive harmonisation in insolvency law in Europe in general, and in financial restructuring in particular. The European Commission has released a recommendation for Member States to review pre-restructuring procedures in their jurisdiction. 139 The recommendation has no legal force but it does carry political weight. The Commission has asked Member States to enact appropriate measures within one year and has stated that it will review progress after 18 months in order to evaluate whether further measures are needed. 140 It might, therefore, be expected to be the first indication of where harmonisation efforts in this area could go. Interestingly, the Commission proposal includes a 'cram down' procedure -the ability for a court to impose a restructuring plan on a dissenting class -and sets out the minimum conditions for the court to provide its confirmation:
(a)
the restructuring plan has been adopted in conditions which ensure the protection of the legitimate interests of creditors;
(b) the restructuring plan has been notified to all creditors likely to be affected by it;
(c) the restructuring plan does not reduce the rights of dissenting creditors below what they would reasonably be expected to receive in the absence of the restructuring, if the debtor's business was liquidated or sold as a going concern, as the case may be.
141
Whilst it appears to be envisaged that creditors would have a right to be heard on the application, 142 the valuation approach adopted in the proposal also appears to be on all fours with the traditional English approach -provided the dissenting class receives no less than it would have received on a liquidation or a going concern sale (as the case may be) then the plan may proceed. Thus the indications from Europe would appear to be a negative influence for change and, at this stage at least, would appear to pull in the same direction as the structural adaptations in the high yield market. This brings the analysis back to the debate between ex ante and ex post convergence as a condition for access to foreign markets. The account here, in which investors pushed for structural change in what they perceived as the highly disadvantageous terms on offer in the UK and Europe when compared with the US, supports the view of those who have argued that it is the entrance of new players in the market pressing for change which drives reform. The short history of the failure to bring about legislative change reinforces the problems of path dependency and the lack of evolution through judicial decision highlights many of the problems with relying on case law to bring about reform which others have noted.
Yet this article also highlights the adaptive capacity of the finance market itself. Thus, provided certain minimum standards are met, the finance market is able structurally to adapt to the legal environment, where the legal environment remains resistant to change. Three states are identified:
a state in which the high yield market is poorly adapted to the legal environment and reinforces other pressure for change, a state in which the high yield market is well-adapted to the apparently fixed legal environment and dampens other pressures for change and a state in which both legacy structures and adapted structures exist at the same time, potentially pulling in different directions.
The difficulty in predicting how the market will move between the three states, coupled with the difficulty of predicting how it will operate with other influences pushing for or against change, illustrate the impossibility of predicting accurately how the systems will evolve. Moreover, this article has investigated a very specific example of the relationship between the law and the finance market from two highly developed economies. It is difficult, therefore, to draw conclusions for the co-evolutionary account of law and finance markets more generally. Instead, a synthesis is attempted of existing theories and the significance of the adaptive capacity of finance markets explored in this article which, it is hoped, might prove a useful framework against which other examples from developed economies can be tested:
1. There needs to be a certain level of confidence in the legal institutions of a country for a market to begin to develop, but at this stage the detail of the legal system may be poorly understood by investors 2. As the market develops, cases will arise which will highlight differences in its operation from other legal regimes with which the investors are more familiar 3. If there are other compelling reasons to invest, this will not necessarily act as a complete brake on the development of the market but may give rise to positive efforts to bring about A fascinating question remains unanswered by the scope of this article. If the legal environment does remain resistant to change but adaptations occur in the finance market dampening pressure for change in law, the question arises as to whether these adaptations increase the cost of capital within the jurisdiction in which they occur. Ultimately, this is the heart of the 'does law matter?' debate. It is notoriously difficult to compare spreads on high yield bonds. 143 But it is hoped that a
